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481 
WHAT DO YOU KNOW? DISCOVERING DOCUMENT 
COMPILATIONS IN 30(B)(6) DEPOSITIONS 
Sara Leonetti* 
Abstract: The work product doctrine emerged as a judicially created, practical solution to 
resolve problems inherent in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP). While the FRCP 
famously sought to broaden discovery and increase parties’ access to information, the rules 
infamously failed to prevent attorneys from discovering each other’s work product. For 
policy reasons—primarily to keep some semblance of the adversarial system—the U.S. 
Supreme Court created work product qualified immunity to prevent attorneys from 
discovering their opponents’ work, mental impressions, and legal strategies. 
At the end of the twentieth century, courts significantly extended the work product 
doctrine when they began to recognize document compilations—the groups of documents 
attorneys use to prepare their witnesses for depositions—as privileged work product. These 
courts found that attorneys’ document selection and organization processes necessarily reveal 
their mental impressions about cases and are therefore shielded by the work product doctrine. 
This relatively new work product designation has led to a flood of litigation and prevented 
deposing attorneys from successfully examining their witnesses. More specifically, deposing 
attorneys cannot effectively test witness memory or credibility when the attorney does not 
know which documents the witness reviewed. 
Nowhere is this problem more apparent, or more problematic, than in the realm of 
30(b)(6) depositions. FRCP 30(b)(6) governs the depositions of corporations. It requires 
corporations to choose a corporate designee who will bind the company as a whole through 
his or her testimony. Because corporate designees are frequently required to testify about vast 
amounts of information relating to the corporation, they almost always review document 
compilations to prepare for their depositions. In fact, their knowledge may be entirely 
secondhand, stemming completely from the documents reviewed rather than their own 
personal experiences. When parties shield these preparatory documents under the work 
product doctrine, they prevent the deposing attorney from learning the basis of the witness’s 
testimony. This puts the examiner at a unique disadvantage. This Comment addresses the 
issue of document compilations in the context of 30(b)(6) depositions. It argues that 30(b)(6) 
document compilations are not work product at all.  
                                                     
* J.D. Candidate, University of Washington School of Law, Class of 2019. I would like to thank the 
editorial staff of Washington Law Review for their support and suggestions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Imagine the following scenario. Patricia brings a Title VII1 action 
against her employer, ABC Corporation (ABC), in federal court. ABC is 
huge. It has thousands of employees and hundreds of managers. Patricia 
wants to depose the corporation, and her attorney follows the rules for 
deposing a corporation as specified by Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
(FRCP) 30(b)(6).2 Patricia’s attorney describes with particularity the 
topics she plans to cover during the deposition—or the “noticed 
topics”—and delivers them to the corporation.3 In response, ABC knows 
it must provide a knowledgeable designee to answer questions on behalf 
of the corporation, binding the corporation.4 
ABC chooses Vince as its designee. Vince has some personal, 
independent knowledge about the noticed topics, but some of the 
relevant events took place before Vince started working at ABC. To 
educate Vince about the designated topics, ABC, through its attorney, 
puts together a “document compilation”—two binders full of 
documents—for Vince to review. 
At the deposition, Patricia’s attorney asks Vince what documents, if 
any, he reviewed in preparation for his deposition. But, before Vince can 
reveal the source of his knowledge, ABC’s attorney tells Vince not to 
answer the question on work product grounds. Patricia’s attorney is left 
in a difficult situation. It will be tough—maybe even impossible—for 
her to impeach Vince if she does not know the source of his knowledge.5 
Furthermore, Vince could easily deny knowing the answer to a damning 
question, and there will be little she can do to challenge this assertion.6 
Finally, Patricia’s attorney will be left wondering if ABC fulfilled its 
duty to prepare its corporate designee if she is unable to learn how the 
corporation prepared him.7 
Courts have consistently held that document compilations, like the 
one ABC’s attorney prepared for Vince, are work product entitled to 
qualified immunity.8 In making that determination, courts have accepted 
                                                     
1. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (2018). 
2. See FED. R. CIV. P. 30(b)(6). 
3. Id. 
4. Id. 
5. See Coryn Group II, LLC v. O.C. Seacrets, Inc., 265 F.R.D. 235 (D. Md. 2010). 
6. Adidas Am., Inc. v. TRB Acquisitions LLC, 324 F.R.D. 389, 398 (D. Or. 2017) (citing 
Nutramax Lab., Inc. v. Twin Lab. Inc., 183 F.R.D. 458, 473 (D. Md. 1998)). 
7. See id. at 394 (explaining duty to prepare 30(b)(6) designee in context of document 
compilations). 
8. See id. at 396–97 (discussing Sporck v. Peil, 759 F.2d 312 (3d Cir. 1985)). 
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the idea that a deposing attorney can work backward from the selected 
documents to infer the defending attorney’s legal strategy.9 Because 
these courts begin with the presumption that all document compilations 
are protected work product, they struggle to apply Federal Rule of 
Evidence (FRE) 612, which often requires the disclosure of documents 
reviewed by witnesses prior to their testimony.10 Courts have come up 
with a number of complex tests to grapple with the arguable conflict 
between the work product doctrine and FRE 612.11 However, at least in 
the context of 30(b)(6) depositions, these tests are superfluous. 
Ultimately, these tests are unnecessary because document compilations 
reviewed by corporate designees are not work product. This Comment 
argues that they are not entitled to qualified immunity in the first place. 
This Comment proceeds in five parts. Part I explains the underlying 
rules at the heart of the problem described above: the work product 
doctrine, FRE 612, and FRCP 30(b)(6). Part II explains why courts 
designate document compilations as work product by examining the 
seminal case Sporck v. Peil.12 It then explores several different tests 
courts have adopted to determine when attorneys must disclose 
document compilation work product. Part III describes why 30(b)(6) 
document compilations are different from those used to prepare lay 
witnesses. It focuses primarily on a 2017 case in which the District of 
Oregon created a new test specifically tailored to 30(b)(6) document 
compilations: Adidas America, Inc. v. TRB Acquisitions LLC.13 Part IV 
analyzes the Adidas decision. This Part argues that, while the court was 
correct to treat 30(b)(6) document compilations as distinct from other 
types of document compilations, the court skipped a step in its analysis. 
It failed to ask the fundamental question: Are 30(b)(6) document 
compilations work product at all? Are they entitled to qualified 
immunity? Had the Adidas Court analyzed the case under a work 
product lens, it could have concluded that 30(b)(6) document 
compilations are not work product, meaning they are not shielded from 
discovery. Finally, Part IV concludes that courts should adopt the 
underlying reasoning from Adidas, which explains the distinct nature of 
30(b)(6) document compilations. However, unlike Adidas, courts should 
                                                     
9. Id. 
10. See, e.g., Adidas, 324 F.R.D. at 399 (adopting a “modified,” fact-specific balancing test). 
11. See, e.g., Nutramax, 183 F.R.D. at 468–50 (adopting a balancing test to weigh the competing 
interests of FRE 612 and the work product doctrine). 
12. 752 F.2d 312. 
13. 324 F.R.D. 389. 
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use this distinction to conclude that 30(b)(6) document compilations are 
not work product at all. 
I. THREE RULES, ONE PROBLEM: WORK PRODUCT, FRE 612, 
AND FRCP 30(b)(6) 
Courts must often decide whether 30(b)(6) document compilations are 
discoverable. As courts engage in this analysis, three rules seem to 
collide: the work product doctrine, FRE 612, and FRCP 30(b)(6).14 
When these three rules intersect, courts struggle to apply them 
simultaneously due to conflicting instructions and underlying policies. 
This Part briefly explains how these three rules function and the policies 
behind them, providing the foundation for further analysis. 
A. Work Product: History, Development, and Purpose 
Prior to the FRCP, discovery was limited, and the legal profession 
generally embraced the “sporting” theory of justice, where “a judicial 
proceeding was a battle of wits rather than a search for the truth.”15 
Indeed, the rules were developed to reduce gamesmanship, concealment 
of evidence, and unfair surprise.16 The FRCP promoted broad discovery 
by creating new discovery tools and by permitting more discovery than 
any state’s civil rules allowed at that time.17 
Work product became problematic soon after the FRCP’s creation in 
1934.18 Trial courts could not reach a consensus about whether they 
should shield work product, and the new rules did not address the 
issue.19 Given the primary purposes of the new rules—namely to 
promote truth-finding and to curb gamesmanship—some courts required 
attorneys to disclose their work product.20 However, many district courts 
reached the opposite conclusion, finding work product immune from 
                                                     
14. See FED. R. CIV. P. 30(b)(6). 
15. Michael A. Blasie, The Uncertain Foundation of Work Product, 67 DEPAUL L. REV. 35, 38–
39 (2017) (quoting 8 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & RICHARD L. MARCUS, 
FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 2002 (3d ed. 2010)). 
16. 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & RICHARD L. MARCUS, FEDERAL PRACTICE 
& PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 1029 (4th ed. 2013)). 
17. Blasie, supra note 15, at 39 (citing 8 WRIGHT, MILLER & MARCUS, supra 15, § 2002). 
18. See ADVISORY COMM. ON RULES FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE, REPORT OF PROPOSED 
AMENDMENTS TO RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES 
39–47 (1946) (discussing FRCP 30). 
19. Blasie, supra note 15, at 42. 
20. Id. 
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discovery.21 These courts offered a variety of different reasons for 
prohibiting work product discovery, and the lack of a coherent theory 
“caused immense confusion.”22 
In 1947, the U.S. Supreme Court finally addressed the issue of work 
product in the seminal case Hickman v. Taylor,23 deciding that work 
product is subject to qualified immunity.24 In Hickman, five crew 
members died when their tugboat sank.25 The tugboat company’s 
attorney, Fortenbaugh, swiftly interviewed survivors and witnesses to 
the accident.26 Fortenbaugh then drafted witness statements and asked 
the witnesses to sign them.27 He also wrote memoranda regarding the 
statements, which included his mental impressions about the witnesses 
and the case.28 Afterward, Hickman, an attorney for one of the deceased 
crew members, sued the tugboat company.29 In an interrogatory, 
Hickman attempted to obtain Fortenbaugh’s witness statements by 
asking Fortenbaugh to “[a]ttach hereto exact copies of all such 
statements if in writing, and if oral, set forth in detail the exact 
provisions of any such oral statements or reports.”30 Hickman requested 
the signed witness statements, “Fortenbaugh’s internal memos of what 
he was told by the witnesses, and a written account of what Fortenbaugh 
remembered the witnesses and survivors told him.”31 At the time, the 
FRCP did not forbid this strategic request. 
                                                     
21. Id.  
22. ADVISORY COMM. ON RULES FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 18, at 40 (“The two 
sentences added at the end of Rule 30(b) deal with the problem of inquiry into writings obtained or 
prepared by the adverse party, his attorneys, agents, or insurers in anticipation of litigation or in 
preparation for trial. The district courts have been in disagreement over the extent to which such an 
inquiry may be made. . . . A considerable number of decisions, for various reasons and to the 
varying extent hereafter indicated, have ruled, however, that the results of investigations or other 
information or matters secured or prepared by the adversary or his representatives in contemplation 
of litigation or in preparation for trial are not the proper subjects of discovery.” (collecting cases)); 
Blasie, supra note 15, at 42 n.50 (citing Hickman v. Taylor, 153 F.2d 212, 220 n.13 (3d Cir. 1945) 
(collecting conflicting cases—some district courts believing work product was immune from 
discovery)). 
23. 329 U.S. 495 (1947). 
24. Id. 
25. Id. at 498. 
26. Id. 
27. Id. 
28. Id. 
29. Id. 
30. Id. at 514 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
31. Charles P. Cercone, The War Against Work Product Abuse: Exposing the Legal Alchemy of 
Document Compilations as Work Product, 64 U. PITT. L. REV. 639, 654 (2003). 
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In its decision, the Court addressed the tension between the new 
FRCP, which favored broad discovery, and the traditional, adversarial 
system.32 It concluded, “discovery, like all matters of procedure, has 
ultimate and necessary boundaries.”33 The Court explained that even 
though the new rules did not address work product, refusing to create a 
work product rule would violate the most basic public policy 
considerations in the legal field.34 It wrote: 
Not even the most liberal of discovery theories can justify 
unwarranted inquiries into the files and the mental impressions 
of an attorney. Historically, a lawyer is an officer of the court 
and is bound to work for the advancement of justice while 
faithfully protecting the rightful interests of his clients. In 
performing his various duties, however, it is essential that a 
lawyer work with a certain degree of privacy, free from 
unnecessary intrusion by opposing parties and their counsel.35 
The Court believed that if the mental impressions of opposing counsel 
were available through the new discovery methods, then attorneys would 
stop writing down their thoughts and opinions.36 “Inefficiency, 
unfairness and sharp practices would inevitably develop in the giving of 
legal advice and in the preparation of cases for trial . . . . And the 
interests of the clients and the cause of justice would be poorly 
served.”37 While the work product doctrine fell outside of the newly 
enacted FRCP, the Court explained that public policy and the legal 
profession required its existence.38 
However, the Hickman decision did not render work product 
completely inaccessible to opposing counsel.39 The Court clarified that 
the work product protection is a qualified immunity.40 It explained that 
when non-privileged facts remain “hidden in an attorney’s file” and the 
“production of those facts is essential to the preparation of one’s case,” 
then discovering work product is appropriate.41 The burden of showing 
                                                     
32. See Hickman, 329 U.S. at 507. 
33. Id. 
34. Id. at 510–11. 
35. Id. 
36. Id. at 511. 
37. Id. 
38. Id. 
39. See id. at 513–14. 
40. Id. 
41. Id. at 511. 
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that the work product is essential, or necessary, for the preparation of 
one’s case rests on the party moving to compel its disclosure.42 
1. FRCP 26(b)(3): A Partial Codification of Work Product 
It was not until 1970 that the FRCP Advisory Committee decided to 
incorporate Hickman and its progeny as FRCP 26(b)(3).43 However, the 
Advisory Committee did not incorporate the entire body of case law into 
the new rule.44 Indeed, courts and commentators acknowledge that 
FRCP 26(b)(3) is a “partial codification” of Hickman and its progeny.45 
FRCP 26(b)(3) gives the following instruction: “Ordinarily, a party may 
not discover documents and tangible things that are prepared in 
anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another party or its 
representative.”46 An attorney may only discover work product if she 
shows that she “has substantial need” for the documents and cannot 
obtain them, or their “substantial equivalent” without enduring “undue 
hardship.”47 The court must take extra steps to protect work product 
when the work product at issue contains an attorney’s “mental 
impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories.”48 
Courts have acknowledged that both Hickman and FRCP 26(b)(3) 
provide a source of protection for work product.49 In other words, if the 
FRCP do not protect a category of alleged work product, Hickman might 
                                                     
42. Id. at 512. 
43. Blasie, supra note 15, at 53–54.  
44. Id. at 54. 
45. Id. at 56 (citing 8 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & RICHARD L. MARCUS, 
FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 2023–24 (3d ed. 2010) (“[T]he preexisting protections 
for intangible work product have continued application despite the 1970 amendment.”)). Blasie 
compiled various other cases, including United States v. Deloitte LLP, 610 F.3d 129, 136 (D.C. Cir. 
2010) (“Hickman provides work-product protection for intangible work product independent 
of Rule 26(b)(3).”); In re Cendent Corp. Secs. Litig., 343 F.3d 658, 662 (3d Cir. 2003) (“It is clear 
from Hickman that work product protection extends to both tangible and intangible work product.”); 
United States v. One Tract of Real Prop. Together with all Bldgs., Improvements, Appurtenances 
and Fixtures, 95 F.3d 422, 428 n.10 (6th Cir. 1996) (“When applying the work product privilege to 
such nontangible information, the principles enunciated in Hickman apply, as opposed to 
Rule 26(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which applies only to ‘documents and 
tangible things.’”); and Alexander v. FBI, 192 F.R.D. 12, 17 (D.D.C. 2000) (“To analyze an attorney 
work-product claim as to intangible work product, courts must look to the caselaw under Hickman 
v. Taylor . . . and its progeny and not to FED. R. CIV. PRO. 26(b)(3), which applies only to 
‘documents and tangible things.’”). Id. at 56 n.169.  
46. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3). 
47. Id. 
48. Id. 
49. See Blasie, supra note 15, at 57. 
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provide protection (and vice versa).50 It is unnecessary for the purposes 
of this Comment to explore the differences between Hickman and 
FRCP 26(b)(3).51 
2. Distinguishing “Opinion” From “Fact” Work Product 
As the work product doctrine developed, courts distinguished 
between “opinion” work product and “fact” work product.52 
FRCP 26(b)(3) also distinguished between the two. Opinion work 
product contains an attorney’s “mental impressions, conclusions, 
opinions, or legal theories.”53 For instance, an attorney’s research 
memoranda containing their analysis and theories of a case is opinion 
work product.54 Unlike opinion work product, fact work product does 
not implicate the attorney’s legal theories or other thoughts about the 
case.55 Courts have defined fact work product as “a lawyer’s tangible 
work product that includes facts but not the lawyer’s mental 
impressions.”56 For example, if an attorney simply takes a witness’s 
statement, without including any of the attorney’s own personal 
thoughts, a court is likely to conclude that the witness statement is fact 
work product rather than opinion work product.57 Courts have 
consistently held that the doctrine requires much stricter protections for 
opinion work product than it does for fact work product, as does 
FRCP 26(b)(3).58 Fact work product “may be ordered to be produced 
upon a showing of substantial need for the information and that the 
                                                     
50. Id. 
51. For a detailed discussion of the differences between Hickman and the FRCP, see Blasie, 
supra note 15.  
52. Crosby v. City of New York, 269 F.R.D. 267, 277 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
53. Id. at 269 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3)(B)). 
54. See, e.g., In re Murphy, 560 F.2d 326, 333–34 (8th Cir. 1977) (explaining that opinion work 
product, unlike fact work product, covers written legal theory and strategy). In Hickman, the 
Supreme Court seems to have also acknowledged this distinction, although not expressly. See 
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 509 (1947) (“We are thus dealing with an attempt to secure the 
production of written statements and mental impressions contained in . . . the mind of the 
attorney.”). 
55. Crosby, 269 F.R.D. at 267. 
56. Id. at 277 n.50 (citing Abdell v. City of New York, No. 05 Civ. 8453 KMK JCF, 2006 WL 
2664313, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 14, 2006)). 
57. See id. at 279 (citing Abdell, 2006 WL 2664313, at *6) (finding statement of facts within 
memorandum to be fact work product, even when summarized by the attorney). 
58. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3)(B); Admiral Ins. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Dist. of 
Ariz., 881 F.2d 1486, 1494 (1989). 
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information cannot be otherwise obtained without undue hardship.”59 
However, to obtain opinion work product, the moving party must show 
that “the mental impressions of counsel are at issue and the need for the 
material is compelling.”60 
The line between fact and opinion work product is not always 
bright.61 However, many courts have held that document compilations 
are opinion work product, as the attorney’s selection strategy and/or 
mental impressions are arguably at issue.62 
B. FRE 612: Writing Used to Refresh a Witness’s Memory 
While the work product doctrine shields documents from disclosure, 
FRE 612 requires the production of certain documents. Generally, if an 
attorney uses documents to refresh a witness’s memory during trial or 
deposition testimony, FRE 612 requires the attorney to show those 
documents to opposing counsel.63 The rule also requires the witness’s 
attorney to produce the documents that the witness reviewed prior to 
testifying if justice requires it.64 Even before FRE 612 existed, counsel 
had a duty to show her opponent the documents she used to refresh a 
witness’s memory during the witness’s testimony.65 FRE 612 expanded 
the rule by adding the possibility of obtaining the documents the witness 
reviewed prior to testifying.66 
The express purpose of FRE 612 is to “promote the search of 
credibility and memory.”67 While a few courts have held that the rule 
does not apply to depositions, the overwhelming majority have held that 
                                                     
59. Adidas Am., Inc. v. TRB Acquisitions LLC, 324 F.R.D. 389, 393 (D. Or. 2017) (citing 
Admiral Ins. Co., 881 F.2d at 1494; FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3)(B)). 
60. Id. at 390 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3)(A)(ii)).  
61. See Abdell, 2006 WL 2664313, at *6 (citing Johnson v. Bryco Arms, Nos. 03 CV 2582, 02 
CV 3029, 2005 WL 469612, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 2005); SR Int’l Bus. Ins. Co. v. World Trade 
Ctr. Properties LLC, No. 01 Civ. 9291, 2002 WL 1455346, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. July 3, 2002)) 
(explaining that lower courts have consistently treated witness statements as “factual rather than 
opinion work product” even when counsel summarizes the testimony). 
62. See, e.g., Sporck v. Peil, 759 F.2d 312 (3d Cir. 1985) (finding document compilations are 
opinion work product because they implicate attorney thought process). For further discussion, see 
infra Section II.B. 
63. FED. R. EVID. 612. 
64. Id. 
65. FED. R. EVID. 612 advisory committee’s notes. 
66. FED. R. EVID. 612. 
67. FED. R. EVID. 612 advisory committee’s notes. 
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it does.68 In the context of depositions, courts have struggled to balance 
FRE 612 and the work product doctrine.69 If a witness reviews a work 
product document to prepare for her deposition, the two rules seem to 
conflict. On one hand, FRE 612 may require disclosure so that the 
deposing attorney can test the witness’s memory and credibility with the 
document. On the other hand, the work product doctrine may require 
non-disclosure to protect the attorney’s legal strategy and preparation. 
C. FRCP 30(b)(6): Deposing a Corporation 
The final rule at play is FRCP 30(b)(6), which governs the 
depositions of corporations. Numerous courts have analyzed the 
apparent tension between FRE 612 and the work product doctrine 
differently when the deponent is a corporation.70 Adopted in 1970, the 
rule provides special deposition duties and instructions when a 
corporation is the deponent.71 Before FRCP 30(b)(6) was established, 
deposing corporations posed two primary problems: (1) it was difficult, 
if not impossible, to figure out which agents or employees had relevant 
information, thereby making the choice of whom to depose challenging, 
and (2) “bandying.”72 Bandying occurred when multiple representatives 
would each claim that they lacked the requisite knowledge to answer 
deposition questions, then advise counsel to ask a different deponent.73 
The Advisory Committee defined bandying as a process by which 
“officers or managing agents of a corporation are deposed in turn but 
                                                     
68. Adidas Am., Inc. v. TRB Acquisitions LLC, 324 F.R.D. 389, 393–94 (D. Or. 2017); Cercone, 
supra note 31, at 669. 
69. See, e.g., Adidas, 324 F.R.D. at 396–99 (summarizing status of the law surrounding the 
discovery of document compilations). 
70. See, e.g., Adidas, 324 F.R.D. 389 (developing a new test that presumes document 
compilations are discoverable in the context of 30(b)(6) depositions); Hsingching Hsu v. Puma 
Biotechnology, Inc., No. 8:15-cv-00865-AG (SHK), 2018 WL 3078589, at *9–11 (C.D. Cal. June 
20, 2018) (applying the test developed in Adidas, presuming document compilations are 
discoverable in the text of corporate deponents); Coryn Group II, LLC v. O.C. Seacrets, Inc., 265 
F.R.D. 235 (D. Md. 2010) (explaining that deposing attorneys are at a disadvantage when unable to 
rely on document compilations to cross-examine corporations in depositions); Nutramax Lab., Inc. 
v. Twin Lab. Inc., 183 F.R.D. 458 (D. Md. 1998) (finding the work product privilege less likely to 
protect document compilations used to prepare corporate deponents). 
71. Craig M. Roen & Catherine O’Connor, Don’t Forget to Remember Everything: The Trouble 
with Rule 30(b)(6) Depositions, 45 U. TOL. L. REV. 29, 34 (2013). 
72. Id. at 34 & n.28 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 30 advisory committee’s notes to 1970 amendments) 
(“[Rule 30(b)(6)] will curb the ‘bandying’ by which officers or managing agents of a corporation 
are deposed in turn but each disclaims knowledge of facts that are clearly known to persons in the 
organization and thereby to it.”). 
73. Id.  
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each disclaims knowledge of the facts that are clearly known to persons 
in the organization and thereby to [the corporation].”74 This finger 
pointing would, unfortunately, result in counsel going on a “wild goose 
chase” for information the corporation had all along.75 
FRCP 30(b)(6) deals with these problems by requiring the corporation 
to produce one or more competent witnesses to answer questions on the 
topics specified by the deposing party.76 The rule imposes duties on both 
parties. The deposing party must list with specificity all of the topics it 
plans to question the corporation about, while the corporation must 
provide at least one designated representative to answer questions on 
those topics.77 To avoid bandying, the corporate designee must have the 
requisite knowledge to answer the deposing attorney’s questions.78 
Additionally, whatever the designee says binds the corporation.79 The 
rule explains the process, stating: 
In its notice or subpoena, a [deposing] party . . . must describe 
with reasonable particularity the matters for examination. The 
named organization must then designate one or more officers, 
directors, or managing agents, or designate other persons who 
consent to testify on its behalf; and it may set out the matters on 
which each person designated will testify. . . . The persons 
designated must testify about information known or reasonably 
available to the organization.80 
By imposing a duty to ensure that the corporate designee has 
sufficient knowledge to answer for the corporation, the system deals 
with both problems: it forces the corporation to identify which of its 
employees or agents has the sought-after information, and it minimizes 
opportunities for bandying.81 The duty to provide a competent corporate 
representative to answer counsel’s questions is well-established.82 
                                                     
74. FED. R. CIV. P. 30(b)(6) advisory committee’s notes to 1970 amendments. 
75. Roen & O’Connor, supra note 71, at 34. 
76. Id.; FED. R. CIV. P. 30(b)(6). 
77. FED. R. CIV. P. 30(b)(6). 
78. FED. R. CIV. P. 30 advisory committee’s notes to 1970 amendments. 
79. R&B Appliance Parts, Inc. v. Amana Co., 258 F.3d 783, 786 (8th Cir. 2001); State Farm Mut. 
Auto. Ins. Co. v. New Horizon, Inc., 250 F.R.D. 203, 213 (E.D. Penn. 2008) (“[T]he testimony of 
the Rule 30(b)(6) designee is deemed to be the testimony of the corporation itself.”); see also 
Dongguk Univ. v. Yale Univ., 270 F.R.D. 70, 73 (D. Conn. 2010) (referencing the binding nature of 
30(b)(6) testimony). 
80. FED. R. CIV. P. 30(b)(6).  
81. Roen & O’Connor, supra note 71, at 34. 
82. See 8 WRIGHT, MILLER & MARCUS, supra note 15, § 2210. 
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II. DOCUMENT COMPILATIONS AS WORK PRODUCT 
This Part examines how document compilations fit into the work 
product analysis. Document compilations are groups of documents 
selected by an attorney for a particular witness to review prior to their 
deposition.83 Many courts have concluded that document compilations 
are opinion work product because they inherently reveal the attorney’s 
mental impressions about the case.84 These courts believe that, if courts 
force attorneys to disclose the document compilations they create, their 
opponents will impermissibly learn about their legal strategies. This Part 
reviews the body of case law that analyzes the work product doctrine as 
it applies to document compilations. It focuses on Sporck v. Peil, 
perhaps the most influential case on the subject. Then, it explains two of 
the most prominent approaches to document compilation discovery since 
Sporck: the “automatic waiver” approach and the “balancing 
approach.”85 
A. Sporck v. Peil: Document Compilations as Opinion Work Product 
The Third Circuit famously addressed the issue of document 
compilations as opinion work product in Sporck v. Peil.86 That case 
involved a discovery dispute in a securities fraud class action suit.87 As 
lead plaintiff, Peil alleged that the president and chairman within the 
defendant corporation had conspired to inflate the value of their stock 
before selling it.88 Discovery was massive and unwieldy; the defendant 
corporation responded to Peil’s interrogatories and document requests 
with a landslide of hundreds of thousands of documents.89 
The work product issue arose when Sporck was deposed in his 
personal capacity, i.e., not as the corporation under 30(b)(6).90 Prior to 
the deposition, Sporck’s counsel created binders of relevant documents 
to prepare Sporck for questioning.91 Though counsel never disclosed 
                                                     
83. See Cercone, supra note 31, at 639. 
84. Id. 
85. See Adidas Am., Inc. v. TRB Acquisitions LLC, 324 F.R.D. 389, 397 (D. Or. 2017) (referring 
to the “automatic waiver” approach); Cercone, supra note 31, at 671, 678 (referring to the 
“balancing approach”). 
86. Sporck v. Peil, 759 F.2d 312, 313 (3d Cir. 1985). 
87. Id. 
88. Id. 
89. Id. at 315. 
90. See id. at 313. 
91. Id. 
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how many documents the binders contained, none of the underlying 
documents were themselves work product or privileged.92 In fact, 
defense counsel alleged that it had already provided all of the underlying 
documents to plaintiffs’ counsel in response to prior discovery 
requests.93 
When the deposition began, Peil’s counsel led with some variation of 
the classic question: “Mr. Sporck, in preparation for this deposition, did 
you have occasion to examine any documents?”94 When Sporck 
answered that he had, the deposing attorney asked him to identify which 
documents he had reviewed.95 However, defense counsel instructed the 
witness not to answer under the theory of work product.96 
Defense counsel claimed that work product applied to the compilation 
of documents, even though none of the documents within the 
compilation were work product or otherwise privileged.97 He argued that 
if opposing counsel could see which documents he selected to prepare 
the witness for his testimony, then they could infer his mental 
impressions about the case.98 Therefore, identifying the documents he 
used to prepare the witness would be opinion work product and immune 
from discovery.99 
The trial court granted Peil’s motion to compel, forcing Sporck to 
identify all of the documents he reviewed to prepare for his 
deposition.100 However, rather than comply with the court’s order, 
Sporck’s counsel daringly chose to ignore the order so he would be held 
in contempt of court and could petition for a writ of mandamus.101 The 
Third Circuit heard the petition and held (1) that the document 
compilation was opinion work product, and (2) FRE 612 does not 
interfere with the work product doctrine in document compilation 
cases.102 Therefore, the lower court committed legal error by requiring 
                                                     
92. Id. 
93. Id. at 314. 
94. Id. 
95. Id. 
96. Id. at 315. 
97. Id. 
98. Id. 
99. Id. 
100. Id. at 314. 
101. Cercone, supra note 31, at 675. 
102. Sporck, 759 F.2d at 318–19.  
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Sporck’s attorney to identify which documents his client relied on in 
preparation for his deposition.103 
1. The Compilation Was Opinion Work Product Because It 
Compromised the Attorney’s Selection Process 
The Sporck Court found that the compilation was opinion work 
product, deciding “that the selection process itself represents defense 
counsel’s mental impressions and legal opinions as to how the evidence 
in the documents relates to the issues and defenses in the litigation.”104 
The court justified its finding with a policy argument focused on the 
value of witness preparation. It opined that Sporck’s counsel might have 
foregone preparing Sporck with documents if he knew that those 
documents would later be subject to disclosure.105 “As a result, [Sporck] 
may not have been as well-prepared for his deposition, and neither 
plaintiff nor defendant would have realized the full benefit of a well-
prepared deponent’s testimony.”106 The court also emphasized the 
adversary role our legal system requires attorneys to play, endorsing the 
view that the discovery process should be a battle of wits rather than a 
search for the truth.107 “That is the historical and the necessary way in 
which lawyers act within the framework of our system of jurisprudence 
to promote justice and to protect their client’s interest.”108 
2. FRE 612 Does Not Interfere with the Work Product Doctrine When 
Document Compilations Are at Issue 
The Sporck Court also concluded that FRE 612 and the work product 
doctrine do not conflict when courts apply both rules properly.109 The 
court walked through the application of FRE 612, explaining that 
counsel must meet three requirements before obtaining documents 
reviewed by a witness prior to his or her testimony.110 The requesting 
party must show that: “(1) the witness must use the writing to refresh his 
memory; (2) the witness must use the writing for the purpose of 
testifying; and (3) the court must determine that production is necessary 
                                                     
103. Id. at 319. 
104. Id. at 315. 
105. Id. at 317. 
106. Id. 
107. See id. 
108. Id. at 316–17 (quoting Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510–11 (1947)). 
109. Id. at 318–19. 
110. Id. at 317. 
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in the interests of justice.”111 If a witness does not rely on the document 
to refresh his or her memory, then the opposing party is not entitled to it, 
as it could not be used to attack the witness’s credibility or memory.112 
In the context of document compilations, the Sporck Court held that 
FRE 612 and work product immunity will never overlap as long as 
courts apply both rules properly.113 Indeed, when attorneys follow the 
requirements of FRE 612, the underlying documents no longer constitute 
opinion work product––or opposing counsel’s mental impressions.114 
The court explained that, when an attorney lays the appropriate 
foundation under FRE 612, the documents are no longer work 
product.115 They are no longer work product because they relate to the 
deposing attorney’s line of questioning––they are not solely documents 
selected by opposing counsel to prepare the witness.116 As the court 
explained: 
[I]f respondent’s counsel had first elicited specific testimony 
from petitioner, and then questioned petitioner as to which, if 
any, documents informed that testimony, the work product 
petitioner seeks to protect––counsel’s opinion of the strengths 
and weaknesses of the case as represented by the group of 
identification of documents selected by counsel––would not 
have been implicated. Rather, because identification of such 
documents would relate to specific substantive areas raised by 
respondent’s counsel, respondent would receive only those 
documents which deposing counsel, through his own work 
product, was incisive enough to recognize and question 
petitioner on. The fear that counsel for petitioner’s work product 
would be revealed would thus become groundless. Rule 612, 
therefore, when properly applied, does not conflict with the 
protection of attorney work product . . . .117 
In the Sporck Court’s scenario, counsel is only entitled to the 
requested documents if they can ask the correct, tailored foundational 
questions pursuant to FRE 612.118 Even then, counsel will only receive 
the documents relevant to the foundational questions asked—not the 
                                                     
111. Id. 
112. Id. 
113. Id. at 318. 
114. Id. at 319. 
115. Id. at 318. 
116. Id. 
117. Id. (emphasis added). 
118. Id. 
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entire compilation of documents used to prepare.119 The court believed 
allowing anything else would undermine the adversarial system.120 
Many courts have adopted Sporck’s reasoning or a variation of it.121 
These courts have concluded that document compilations are opinion 
work product, and FRE 612 does not require attorneys to turn them over 
when asked.122 Instead, the deposing attorney must lay the foundation 
under FRE 612 for each requested document through her own 
questioning; she cannot gain access to the entire compilation by simply 
asking the classic question: “Which documents did you review in 
preparation for your deposition?”123 
3. The Dissent: Document Compilations Are Not Work Product 
Judge Collins J. Seitz dissented in Sporck, arguing that the majority 
had gone too far in designating document compilations as work 
product.124 He believed that the mere identification of documents shown 
to the witness prior to his deposition could not reasonably reveal any 
litigation strategy.125 Indeed, he argued this theory is flawed because “it 
assumes that one can extrapolate backwards from the results of a 
selection process to determine the reason a document was selected for 
review by the deponent.”126 Judge Seitz worried that the work product 
doctrine would expand to hinder other forms of legitimate discovery, 
since nearly every action taken by an attorney can lead “to similar vague 
inferences.”127 
B. After Sporck: Different Approaches to Resolving the Apparent 
Conflict Between FRE 612 and the Work Product Doctrine 
While some courts have adopted Sporck’s approach, other courts have 
dealt with the apparent conflict between FRE 612 and the work product 
doctrine differently.128 Two of the most common approaches courts have 
                                                     
119. Id. 
120. Id. at 316. 
121. Cercone, supra note 31, at 674. 
122. See id. 
123. See id. 
124. Sporck, 759 F.2d at 319 (Seitz, J., dissenting). 
125. Id. 
126. Id. 
127. Id. 
128. Cercone, supra note 31, at 670. 
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taken are the “automatic waiver” approach and the “balancing test” 
approach.129 
1. The Automatic Waiver Approach 
A few courts have held that attorneys waive the work product 
immunity when they show documents to a witness to prepare that 
witness for their testimony.130 Since document compilations are always 
shown to witnesses prior to their testimony, they are always discoverable 
under an automatic waiver approach.131 Courts that adopt the automatic 
waiver theory find that the policies underpinning FRE 612—namely 
fostering effective cross-examination and the ability to test the witness’s 
credibility—outweigh the policies underlying the work product 
doctrine.132 If an attorney uses privileged documents to prepare a 
witness, that attorney should not be allowed to shield that witness from 
effective cross-examination by refusing to disclose the documents 
reviewed.133 Otherwise, an attorney may choose to use only privileged 
documents to prepare a witness, giving the deposing or crossing attorney 
no way to effectively challenge the witness’s testimony at the deposition 
or on the stand.134 
2. The Balancing Approach 
Most courts have attempted to resolve the conflict between FRE 612 
and the work product doctrine by harmonizing the two rules.135 These 
courts heavily consider the policy justifications underpinning each rule 
to decide when one rule trumps the other.136 
Nutramax Laboratories, Inc. v. Twin Laboratories137 offered a 
particularly influential balancing test that subsequent courts have looked 
                                                     
129. See id. at 671, 677.  
130. Adidas Am., Inc. v. TRB Acquisitions LLC, 324 F.R.D. 389, 397 (D. Or. 2017).  
131. Id. 
132. Id. 
133. Id. at 398 (citing Nutramax Labs., Inc. v. Twin Labs. Inc., 183 F.R.D. 458, 473 (D. Md. 1998)). 
134. Id. 
135. Id.; Cercone, supra note 31, at 67. 
136. See, e.g., Adidas, 324 F.R.D. at 399 (“After reviewing numerous cases and several leading 
treatises involving FRE 612 and attorney-client privileged or work-product protected documents, 
and considering the purposes and requirements of depositions of a corporate representative 
designated under FRCP 30(b)(6), the Court finds that the application of FRE 612 should be different 
in the context of a deposition of a percipient witness.”). 
137. 183 F.R.D. 458 (1998). 
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to for guidance.138 Unlike the Sporck Court, which believed that 
FRE 612 and the work product doctrine did not conflict, the Nutramax 
Court believed there was a “clear conflict” between the rules.139 
Nevertheless, the test it offered is surprisingly similar to the Sporck 
test.140 Like the Sporck Court, it held that (1) document compilations 
were protected work product, and (2) that each prong of FRE 612 must 
be met for that work product to be revealed.141 However, where 
Nutramax differed from Sporck was in its analysis of FRE 612’s third 
prong—whether “justice” requires disclosure.142 To answer this 
question, the court implemented a balancing test, focusing on the 
policies underlying each rule.143 
According to the Nutramax Court, the following factors are examples 
of the types of concerns courts should analyze in their balancing 
approach. First, courts should note the deponent’s status.144 They should 
ask whether the witness is an expert or corporate designee under 
FRCP 30(b)(6), as “[t]here is a greater need to know what materials 
were reviewed by expert and designee witnesses in preparation for 
deposition since the substance of their testimony may be based on 
sources beyond personal knowledge.”145 Second, courts should consider 
the time between the relevant events and the deposition, as it is more 
likely that the documents influenced the witness’s testimony if the 
events took place long ago.146 Third, courts should ask if the documents 
within the compilation contain the explicit legal opinions or mental 
impressions of opposing counsel.147 If they do, then requiring their 
                                                     
138. See, e.g., Coryn Group II, LLC v. O.C. Seacrets, Inc., 265 F.R.D. 235, 240–43 (D. Md. 
2010) (analyzing the Nutramax Court’s balancing test); N. Nat. Gas Co. v. Approx. 9177.53 Acres, 
289 F.R.D. 644, 649 (D. Kan. 2013) (using Nutramax to conclude that document compilations are 
not always shielded by the work product doctrine). 
139. Nutramax, 183 F.R.D. at 461. 
140. Id. at 468. 
141. The Sporck Court believed that, if the prongs of FRE 612 were met, then the requested 
documents were no longer work product. Sporck v. Peil, 759 F.2d 312, 318 (3d Cir. 1985). Unlike 
Sporck, the Nutramax Court found that the document compilation was work product regardless of 
whether the prongs of FRE 612 were satisfied. See Nutramax, 183 F.R.D. at 468–69. However, it 
held that the work product privilege was waived when FRE 612 was met. Id. at 467. Therefore, if 
the use of a document compilation meets FRE 612’s prongs, then the work product immunity is 
waived under the Nutramax Court’s balancing test. Id. 
142. Nutramax, 183 F.R.D. at 468–69. 
143. Id. at 473. 
144. Id. at 469. 
145. Id. 
146. Id. 
147. Id. at 470. 
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disclosure may undermine the adversarial system in an unacceptable 
way.148 Finally, courts should consider whether the documents in the 
compilation have already been discovered.149 An attorney may argue that 
he need not disclose the documents a second time if opposing counsel 
already has access to them through some other means of discovery. 
However, the forcefulness of this argument may diminish if the 
documents previously produced are so voluminous or technical 
that the party receiving them cannot readily be expected to grasp 
their significance. Finding the critical documents in a population 
of thousands may be like looking for a needle in a haystack, 
even with the aid of modern technology.150 
These are just a few of the factors that the Nutramax Court suggested 
balancing, all of which implicate policies behind the competing rules.151 
Nutramax has inspired many courts in their application of balancing 
tests.152 Those courts have agreed that if the first two prongs of FRE 612 
are met, then a balancing test is appropriate to determine “whether 
production is necessary for fair cross-examination” or whether the 
examining party is simply engaged in a “fishing expedition” that 
FRE 612 would otherwise prohibit.153 
III. PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER: CORPORATE DESIGNEES, 
DOCUMENT COMPILATIONS, AND WORK PRODUCT 
As explained in Part I, under FRCP 30(b)(6), corporations have a 
special duty to provide a deponent who is competent to testify about the 
designated topics.154 Corporate deponents rarely, if ever, know all of the 
information necessary to meet this duty.155 Oftentimes, they will be 
responsible for knowing about events that happened before they began 
working for the corporation or about complicated issues in which they 
only played a minor role.156 Sometimes, corporate deponents are “empty 
vessel[s],” and know little to nothing about the topics selected by 
                                                     
148. Id. 
149. Id. 
150. Id. 
151. Id. 
152. Cercone, supra note 31, at 680 (collecting cases). 
153. In re Rivastigmine Patent Litig., 486 F. Supp. 2d 241, 243 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (quoting Berkey 
Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 74 F.R.D. 613, 615 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)). 
154. Roen & O’Connor, supra note 71, at 30. 
155. Id. at 29. 
156. Id. at 31. 
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deposing counsel.157 To avoid bandying, corporations are responsible for 
educating their deponents so they are prepared to answer honestly as the 
corporation.158 Usually, this is a daunting task, and corporate designees 
must review documents to fulfill their duties under FRCP 30(b)(6).159 
Corporate designees will have an even bigger task ahead of them if they 
are “empty vessels.”160 In that case, the designee must start from scratch 
and rely exclusively on the documents gathered by the corporation and 
its attorney.161 
Courts that have adopted balancing tests acknowledge the importance 
of distinguishing between witnesses who testify from their own personal 
knowledge and those who do not.162 In fact, witness status (whether the 
witness is a lay witness, expert, or corporate designee) was the first 
factor considered by the Nutramax Court in its balancing test.163 Ruling 
on the same issue, the District Court of Maryland explained that 
disclosure of document compilations is usually appropriate when the 
witness is a corporate designee164 because the witness must rely on those 
documents to fulfill his duties under FRCP 30(b)(6).165 In its decision, 
the court worried about corporate counsel improperly coaching 30(b)(6) 
designees and hiding important documents: 
[P]articularly in the context of a Rule 30(b)(6) designee, “[i]t is 
all too easy for a witness to testify that his recollection is 
vague . . . [and] rigorous cross examination is needed to test 
such self-serving statements by focused, analytical 
questioning . . . to test the witness’s assertions.” Where a 
30(b)(6) deponent has no personal (or independent) knowledge 
of a topic, factual documents prepared for him to allow him to 
discharge his obligations under Rule 30(b)(6) must necessarily 
                                                     
157. Coryn Grp. II, LLC v. O.C. Seacrets, Inc., 265 F.R.D. 235, 243 (D. Md. 2010); Roen & 
O’Connor, supra note 71, at 37 (“Courts often seem oblivious to the obvious problem that Rule 
30(b)(6) designated witnesses often lack personal knowledge of the subject matter, and 
consequently, may have difficulty providing complete responses on behalf of the organization.”). 
158. FED. R. CIV. P. 30(b)(6) advisory committee’s notes to 1970 amendments. 
159. Roen & O’Connor, supra note 71, at 31. 
160. Adidas Am., Inc. v. TRB Acquisitions LLC, 324 F.R.D. 389, 399–400 (D. Or. 2017) (“[I]t is 
the corporation that has the ‘prior knowledge of the facts contained in the documents’ and thus it is 
the corporation’s knowledge that is being ‘refreshed’ under FRE 612.” (quoting Coryn Grp. II, 265 
F.R.D. at 242)). 
161. Id.; Roen & O’Connor, supra note 71, at 31–32. 
162. See, e.g., Nutramax Labs., Inc. v. Twin Labs. Inc., 183 F.R.D. 458, 469–70 (D. Md. 1998). 
163. Id. 
164. Coryn Grp. II, 265 F.R.D. at 242 (quoting Nutramax, 183 F.R.D. at 469). 
165. Id. 
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be produced. How would it serve the pursuit of truth to shield 
such information, where the very same information would be 
available through other discovery devices? Denial of access 
would only cloud, rather than clarify, corporate knowledge.166 
While many courts with balancing tests acknowledge that witness 
status is significant, it is just one factor they weigh when deciding 
whether a document compilation is discoverable. The fact that a witness 
is a 30(b)(6) designee is not dispositive of whether the document 
compilation reviewed by that witness is discoverable.167 
A. Coming up with a New Test: Adidas America, Inc. v. TRB 
Acquisitions LLC 
Though the Ninth Circuit has not weighed in on the issue of document 
compilations as work product, the District of Oregon recently announced 
a new test that addresses this issue in the context of 30(b)(6) depositions 
specifically.168 In Adidas America, Inc. v. TRB Acquisitions LLC, the 
defendant deposed two Adidas witnesses under FRCP 30(b)(6).169 
Adidas attorneys used document compilations to prepare these witnesses 
so that they would be sufficiently educated to answer questions about the 
topics designated by the defendant.170 
Similar to courts that have adopted balancing tests, the Adidas Court 
recognized that 30(b)(6) depositions are special.171 Documents rather 
than personal experience are often the true source of the deponent’s 
knowledge.172 Additionally, FRCP 30(b)(6) imposes special duties upon 
the corporation to educate its designee.173 However, the court was 
conflicted, unsure if it should adopt a balancing approach or a complete 
waiver approach.174 Instead of adopting either full-stop, the court 
claimed it split the baby in half by adopting a new, “middle ground 
approach” somewhere between the two.175 The Adidas Court held: 
(1) the Sporck test––which consists of FRE 612’s three prongs––is the 
                                                     
166. Id. at 245 (citations omitted) (quoting Nutramax, 183 F.R.D. at 473). 
167. See Adidas Am., Inc. v. TRB Acquisitions LLC, 324 F.R.D. 389, 399 (D. Or. 2017). 
168. Id. 
169. Id. at 392. 
170. Id. 
171. Id. at 399. 
172. Roen & O’Connor, supra note 71, at 29. 
173. Id.; FED. R. CIV. P. 30(b)(6). 
174. Adidas, 324 F.R.D. at 399. 
175. Id. 
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appropriate test to determine if document compilations are admissible 
over a work product objection176 and (2) in the context of 30(b)(6) 
depositions, the court will presume that the first two prongs of the 
Sporck test are met, and the burden will shift to the non-moving party to 
show that one of the prongs is lacking.177 
1. The First Prong––Whether the Documents Refreshed the 
Designee’s Recollection 
The Adidas Court explained that in the context of 30(b)(6) 
depositions, courts should broadly construe what it means to “refresh” 
the witness’s memory.178 For instance, a corporation should be said to 
refresh its memory when it educates its corporate designee to testify on 
its behalf.179 In other words, courts should not distinguish between 
educating corporate designees and “refreshing” the corporation’s 
memory.180 
The court then declared that this prong is presumably met when a 
corporation, or its attorney, chooses to prepare the designee with 
selected documents.181 However, even under the new Adidas test, a party 
can overcome this presumption by showing that the designee had 
firsthand, independent knowledge of all the noticed topics, and did not 
need to review documents to recall any information.182 Because this is 
rarely the case, in the interest of fairness and efficiency, the Adidas 
Court presumed that the document compilation was “intended to and did 
refresh the recollection of and influence the testimony of the 
witnesses.”183 
2. The Second Prong––Whether the Documents Were Used for 
Testifying 
Just like the first prong, the Adidas Court decided a rebuttable 
presumption is appropriate for the second prong in the context of 
30(b)(6) depositions as well.184 Generally, to determine whether the 
                                                     
176. Id. 
177. Id. 
178. Id. 
179. Id. 
180. Id. 
181. Id. 
182. Id. at 402. 
183. Id. 
184. Id. at 400. 
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second prong is met, courts must complete an arduous, in camera review 
of the contested documents to determine whether they actually 
influenced the witness’s testimony.185 If they did influence the witness, 
then they were used for the purpose of testifying.186 The Adidas Court 
considered the inefficiency of the in camera review process and weighed 
it against fairness concerns.187 
The court found that a rebuttable presumption in this context is both 
appropriate and fair because the documents at issue are responsive to the 
noticed topics.188 They are provided precisely to educate the 30(b)(6) 
designee.189 Indeed, in this context, the document compilation’s purpose 
is to ensure that the designee has all the information necessary to fulfill 
their duties under FRCP 30(b)(6).190 Therefore, by showing selected 
documents to the designee in response to the noticed topics, corporate 
counsel’s purpose is necessarily to shape testimony.191 
3. The Third Prong––Whether Justice Requires Disclosure 
Like many courts before it, the Adidas Court adopted a balancing test, 
weighing the policy interests of FRE 612 and the work product 
doctrine.192 While the court did not explicitly apply a rebuttable 
presumption to the third prong as it did for the first two, it noted that in 
the context of 30(b)(6) depositions, “there is a heightened need for 
robust disclosure in this context.”193 
In its consideration of Sporck’s final prong, the court was concerned 
about documents within the compilation that contained privileged 
information or work product.194 It worried that deposing counsel would 
notice topics covering privileged information for the sole purpose of 
discovering privileged information.195 The court dispensed of this 
concern quite quickly, stating corporations could get protective orders to 
avoid disclosing documents containing privileged information or work 
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product.196 By requiring the corporation to sift through the documents 
and move for protective orders when necessary, the court shifted the 
burden to the corporate designee again, reasoning “FRE 612 does not 
need to be weakened . . . to provide the necessary protections for 
[privileged information] under the narrow circumstances” where the 
opposing party notices improper topics solely to obtain privileged 
information.197 
In sum, the Adidas Court concluded that a different test was 
appropriate for 30(b)(6) witnesses than for witnesses testifying in their 
personal capacities.198 The court reached this conclusion for the same 
policy reasons elucidated by the Nutramax Court: litigants have a 
“heightened need to discover” documents that counsel selects to prepare 
a 30(b)(6) witness because those witnesses do not testify solely from 
their own, independent knowledge.199 Concealing which documents the 
deponent used to prepare for a 30(b)(6) deposition would not clarify 
corporate knowledge––the main purpose of FRCP 30(b)(6).200 Instead, it 
would only cast confusion over the corporation’s knowledge.201 
Similarly, it would put the deposing attorney at an unacceptable 
disadvantage, as she would not be able to point to inconsistencies 
between privileged documents and the witness’s testimony; she would 
not be able to develop an effective cross-examination or impeach.202 The 
Adidas Court worried: 
A corporate designee could testify only as to information and 
communications that are advantageous. Other information that 
would contradict the testimony or undermine the corporation’s 
position and was contained in the documents could be ignored, 
and the opposing party would have no way of knowing how to 
test or challenge the corporate designee’s testimony.203 
The Adidas Court also worried that corporations would require their 
attorneys to prepare their corporate designees, rather than undergo the 
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task themselves, for the sole purpose of claiming work product 
immunity.204 The court emphasized the corporation has the responsibility 
to gather documents relevant to the noticed topics and to educate its 
30(b)(6) witness––that particular obligation does not rest on the 
attorney.205 The court explained that a corporation cannot shield itself 
from its discovery duties under the FRCP by collecting the required 
documents, showing those documents to its attorney, then claiming work 
product immunity.206 The Adidas Court addressed this concern, 
concluding that a corporation should not be allowed to “shield itself 
from the duties required under the rules of discovery” by asking its 
attorneys to prepare document compilations, then refusing to produce 
those compilations under a work product theory.207 
IV. ADIDAS: THE RIGHT DIRECTION, THE WRONG REASONING 
A. The Adidas Court Should Have Analyzed the Fundamental 
Question: “Does Work Product Immunity Cover 30(b)(6) 
Document Compilations?” 
The Adidas Court considered the document compilation issue in the 
specific context of 30(b)(6) deponents, acknowledging that corporate 
designees should be treated differently.208 Like many courts before it, the 
Adidas Court was unsure how to effectively apply both the work product 
doctrine and FRE 612.209 However, in the court’s attempt to apply both 
rules, it took something for granted; it quickly held that all document 
compilations are opinion work product.210 It never stopped to consider 
whether the work product doctrine applies to 30(b)(6) document 
compilations.211 
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Had the Adidas Court begun with this fundamental question, it could 
have avoided pitting the work product doctrine and FRE 612 against 
each other. Such an approach would have been consistent with Sporck—
one of the most influential cases on this issue. Indeed, the Adidas Court 
should have used Sporck’s approach to focus on the work product 
doctrine’s applicability rather than balancing the policies of FRE 612 
and the work product doctrine. 
As explained Section II.A.2, the Sporck Court held that FRE 612 and 
the work product doctrine never overlap in the context of document 
compilations when both rules are properly applied.212 The Sporck court 
did not hold that FRE 612 trumps work product in some instances and 
vice versa.213 Rather, it concluded that the rules did not conflict because 
it understood that a document, while perhaps work product at first, can 
change status depending on the surrounding circumstances.214 In other 
words, materials—like a document compilation—may not be work 
product at all depending on the surrounding circumstances. In that case, 
the compilation moves outside the work product protection and into the 
realm of discoverable evidence.215 
The Sporck Court explained how a document might move outside the 
work product protection and become discoverable.216 Specifically, it 
held that when an attorney asks the appropriate foundational questions 
under FRE 612, then the relevant documents are no longer work 
product.217 They are no longer work product because the requesting 
attorney has asked the appropriate questions, and the documents relate to 
those questions––not the defending attorney’s mental processes. 
“[B]ecause identification of such documents would relate to specific 
substantive areas raised by respondent’s counsel, respondent would 
receive only those documents which deposing counsel, through his own 
work product, was incisive enough to recognize and question petitioner 
on.”218 Therefore, under Sporck, selected documents used to prepare a 
witness for a deposition are not always work product; and whether they 
are work product will depend on the circumstances.219 
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B. The Adidas Court Could Have Used Nearly Identical Reasoning to 
Conclude 30(b)(6) Document Compilations Are Not Work Product 
The Adidas Court focused its reasoning on deciding which rule 
trumped: FRE 612 or work product.220 However, the court analyzed the 
case under the wrong lens. Rather than jump to a balancing test, the 
court should have applied the facts of the case to a work product 
analysis. Though the Adidas Court did not engage in this analysis, the 
court’s underlying reasoning strongly supports the conclusion that 
30(b)(6) document compilations are not work product. Indeed, one can 
use the Adidas Court’s reasoning to conclude that 30(b)(6) document 
compilations are not work product at all. This Section will do just that—
apply the Adidas Court’s reasoning to a work product analysis and 
conclude that the work product doctrine does not cover 30(b)(6) 
document compilations. 
1. The Requesting Party Cannot “Extrapolate Backwards” from a 
30(b)(6) Document Compilation to Guess Their Opponent’s Case 
Theory 
The Adidas Court accepted the notion that attorneys can infer 
opposing counsel’s mental impressions by reviewing document 
compilations,221 but it did not need to reach that conclusion. Whether an 
attorney can glean opposing counsel’s case strategy via document 
compilations is debatable.222 Judge Seitz, the dissenter in Sporck, 
explained this issue clearly by stating, “The problem with [this] theory is 
that it assumes that one can extrapolate backwards from the results of a 
selection process to determine the reason a document was selected for 
review by the deponent.”223 In a 30(b)(6) deposition, the idea that 
deposing counsel can “extrapolate backwards” from the selection 
process is even more unrealistic. 
The Adidas Court expressly acknowledged many of the reasons 
counsel cannot “extrapolate backwards” when it comes to corporate 
designees. First, the court explains that the counsel requesting 
documents cannot have access to every document relied upon by 
opposing counsel.224 Rather, deposing counsel only has access to the 
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documents shown to the witness. Deposing counsel cannot conduct a 
“fishing expedition” or “wholesale” exploration of opposing counsel’s 
files.225 
Second, the Adidas Court explains that corporate designees prepare 
their testimony in response to deposing counsel’s noticed topics.226 
Therefore, the documents they review necessarily relate to deposing 
counsel’s theories and requests—not corporate counsel’s theory of the 
case. The Adidas Court expressly acknowledged this point, explaining 
that deposing counsel must use “painstaking specificity” to designate 
“the particular subject areas that are intended to be questioned.”227 
Indeed, in 30(b)(6) depositions, an attorney is likely to review 
documents with her witness because the attorney believes opposing 
counsel will focus on them––not because they are particularly relevant to 
her case theory.228 
Third, as the Adidas Court noted, corporate designees must often 
review a plethora of documents just to become familiar with basic 
information on the noticed topics; one person rarely has all the 
knowledge required to testify as a corporate designee independently.229 
If counsel does not know which documents the witness reviewed to gain 
basic background knowledge, then it is even less likely that they will be 
able to “extrapolate backwards” and determine an underlying legal 
theory from the document compilation. 
Fourth, the Adidas Court acknowledged that 30(b)(6) depositions 
function similarly to other discovery tools under the FRCP.230 The court 
could have easily expounded on this argument to conclude that the 
document selection process is not opinion work product. If we assume 
that revealing document compilations exposes an attorney’s litigation 
strategy, then we must be ready to accept that nearly every discovery 
tool in the FRCP forces attorneys to reveal their litigation strategies.231 
In fact, many pretrial requirements force attorneys to reveal their 
strategies to some extent, often more directly than revealing document 
compilations.232 Judge Seitz and other commentators have explained this 
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problem.233 Professor Charles P. Cercone explains this issue in depth: 
“[I]nterrogatories under FRCP 33(b), requests for admission under 
FRCP 36, pretrial disclosure, disclosures of documents under 
FRCP 26(a)(1)(B), and pretrial memoranda under FRCP 16 all require 
litigants to disclose their evaluations and strategies of the case in a way 
that is much more direct than document compilation.”234 
In sum, the Adidas Court inadvertently explained why 30(b)(6) 
document compilations are not opinion work product throughout its 
decision—it is nearly impossible to “extrapolate backwards” and infer 
opposing counsel’s mental impressions. The Court should have reached 
this conclusion rather than engage in a balancing test. 
2. Requiring Production Will Not Lead to Inadequate Preparation by 
Either Party 
Encouraging attorneys to prepare their cases adequately is a primary 
policy justification underpinning the work product doctrine.235 Indeed, 
the Hickman Court focused on this concern when it first announced the 
doctrine.236 Courts fear that attorneys will not prepare their cases 
adequately if their work product is discoverable.237 They worry attorneys 
will stop writing things down—they will not prepare work product at 
all––to prevent their opponents from learning their legal strategies.238 
Corporations have an additional burden under FRCP 30(b)(6) to prepare 
their corporate designees, and courts and commentators have expressed 
concern that corporations may violate FRCP 30(b)(6) for fear of waiving 
work product immunity.239 
Though the Adidas Court does not expressly address this concern, it 
consistently refers to the parties’ duties under FRCP 30(b)(6): 
“[W]itnesses designated under FRCP 30(b)(6) are unique based on the 
specific obligations and responsibilities placed on both the noticing party 
and responding party . . . .”240 While some attorneys may refuse to 
prepare corporate designees, doing so would violate FRCP 30(b)(6) and 
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the ethical responsibilities attorneys have to represent their clients 
adequately.241 The concern that some attorneys will violate rules should 
not shape the rules or the work product doctrine. Furthermore, as 
Professor Cercone has explained, it is quite unlikely that attorneys will 
forego preparing witnesses to avoid disclosing which documents they 
used to prepare those witnesses.242 “[S]ophisticated clients in 
corporations would not be impressed with a lawyer who did not review 
documents prior to a deposition with a witness, particularly after they 
have spent thousands of dollars assembling the documents in response to 
the deposing party’s discovery request.”243 
Preventing “freeloading” is another policy consideration underpinning 
the work product doctrine.244 Freeloading occurs when the deposing 
attorney relies on his opponent’s work, rather than use his or her own 
mental prowess to gain information.245 In Hickman, the court’s 
freeloading concern was logical because the documents at issue were 
legal memoranda containing counsel’s mental impressions and 
interviews with witnesses.246 Obtaining such direct and revealing 
opinion work product from an adversary would make it much easier for 
attorneys to build their cases; if requesting attorneys had outlines of their 
opponent’s strategies, they would not need to do nearly as much work to 
research and craft their own arguments.247 
The Adidas Court indirectly addresses why the freeloading concern 
makes little sense in the context of 30(b)(6) depositions.248 As the court 
explains, deposing counsel do not want to know which documents 
deponents review in order to glean their opponents’ legal strategies.249 
Rather, they want these documents to cross-examine the deponents—to 
test credibility and memory.250 They want these documents to ensure that 
corporations actually prepare their witnesses to comply with their 
30(b)(6) duties.251 They want these documents to learn whether 
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corporate counsel inappropriately coached their witnesses by refusing to 
show those witnesses damning documents.252 
Numerous courts and commentators, including the Adidas Court, have 
recognized that corporations have misused the work product doctrine in 
the context of 30(b)(6) depositions to shield their witnesses from 
effective cross-examination.253 Indeed, by refusing to reveal which 
documents the corporate designee reviewed, the corporation puts the 
crossing attorney at an “unfair disadvantage.”254 By acknowledging that 
document compilations are desired for cross-examination purposes,255 
these courts incidentally put the “freeloading” concern to rest. 
C. Courts Should Use the Underlying Reasoning in Adidas to 
Conclude that 30(b)(6) Document Compilations Are Not Opinion 
Work Product 
This Comment’s proposed solution is simple. Rather than jump to 
balancing tests to decide if a given document compilation is 
discoverable, courts must first analyze the circumstances under which 
the compilation was prepared and ask the fundamental question: “Is this 
compilation work product?” They should first ask whether a person 
could reasonably look at the documents within the compilation and infer 
the legal strategy of the attorney who created it. If not, then the 
compilation is not opinion work product, and no balancing test is 
necessary to weigh the competing interests of FRE 612 and the work 
product doctrine. Additionally, when deciding if a document compilation 
constitutes opinion work product, courts must remember the policies 
underpinning the work product doctrine. For instance, if the deposing 
attorney wants the compilation to impeach the witness rather than to 
“freeload,” then the compilation begins to look less like work product. 
Essentially, courts should not start with balancing tests that ask the 
question: “Which rule trumps, FRE 612 or work product?” Rather, 
courts must ask: “Are the policies underlying the work product doctrine 
implicated such that this document compilation should be considered 
work product?” 
Using this approach, courts should conclude that 30(b)(6) document 
compilations are never work product. The context surrounding 30(b)(6) 
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document compilations makes them discoverable. As the Adidas Court 
acknowledged, in the specific context of 30(b)(6) depositions, it is 
unlikely that a deposing attorney can extrapolate backwards from the 
document compilation to learn her opponent’s strategies.256 Additionally, 
the Adidas Court implicitly acknowledged that none of the concerns 
underpinning the work product doctrine are at issue in the context of 
30(b)(6) document compilations257; neither party will be less likely to 
prepare their cases if the compilations are discoverable. 
Even if courts find that 30(b)(6) document compilations implicate the 
mental impressions of the attorneys who create them, courts should still 
conclude that they are not work product. Courts can reach this 
conclusion by embracing the nuanced reasoning in Sporck. Namely, 
courts should accept the notion that a document within a compilation can 
begin as work product and become non-work product based on the 
circumstances.258 In Sporck, the documents moved outside the work 
product protection because the deposing attorney asked the appropriate 
foundational questions.259 The documents were therefore no longer a 
product of the defending attorney’s mind.260 Instead, the documents were 
the fruits of the questioning attorney’s work.261 Similarly, 30(b)(6) 
document compilations are a product of the deposing attorney’s work. 
Defending attorneys prepare document compilations in response to the 
particularized requests of deposing counsel under FRCP 30(b)(6). In 
other words, both parties put in work to comply with their duties under 
FRCP 30(b)(6). If courts continue to find that 30(b)(6) document 
compilations are work product, they must also be ready to accept that 
other traditional and important discovery methods are shielded by work 
product. For instance, the FRCP facilitate requests for admission, pretrial 
memoranda, and interrogatory responses, all of which compromise 
counsels’ mental impressions more directly than 30(b)(6) document 
compilations do. 
CONCLUSION 
Many courts have held that 30(b)(6) document compilations are work 
product and developed elaborate tests to get around work product 
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immunity. However, those attempts to overcome the work product 
immunity are superfluous because document compilations are not work 
product in the context of 30(b)(6) depositions. When it comes to 
30(b)(6) depositions, the risk that an attorney’s mental impressions will 
be implicated is low. Furthermore, the reasons attorneys request 
disclosure have nothing to do with unfairly uncovering their opponents’ 
legal strategies. Designating 30(b)(6) document compilations as work 
product ignores the realities of litigation. Attorneys do not wish to know 
what documents a corporate designee relied on to glean insight into 
opposing counsel’s legal strategies. Rather, they seek these documents to 
hold the corporation and the witness accountable––to avoid “bandying” 
and the spread of misinformation that FRCP 30(b)(6) was designed to 
curtail. Refusing to disclose 30(b)(6) document compilations only serves 
to cloud corporate knowledge and prevent the legitimate investigation of 
corporations. 
